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Unlawful Sexual Intercourse: Old
Notions and A Suggested Reform
Unlawful Sexual Intercourse. "Unlawful sexual intercourse is an act of
sexual intercourse with afemale, not the wife of the perpetrator, where
the female is under the age of 18years. "1
Despite the trend toward sex-neutral statutes, Penal Code Section
261.5 continues to distribute its protections and burdens according to
sex. This section of the Penal Code, more commonly known as the
"statutory rape" section, was excised from the statutory definition of
rape2 in 1970,1 then reenacted and retitled "Unlawful Sexual Inter-
course with a Female Under Age 18."1 Although the forcible rape stat-
ute, Section 261, was amended in 1979 to make its wording sex-
neutral,5 Section 261.5 continues to classify victims and offenders ac-
cording to sex.
This sex-specific statute has several consequences. If a male and fe-
male, both under age 18, engage in consensual sexual intercourse, the
male can be charged with a crime that could send him to state prison
for up to three years6 while the female incurs no criminal liability.
7
Even if the female is older and more sexually experienced than the
male and is in fact the aggressor in the act, still only the male faces a
felony charge while the female goes free.8 If an adult woman seduces a
I. CAL. PENAL CODE §261.5.
2. Id. §261.
3. CAL. STATS. 1979, c. 1301, §2, at 2406.
4. CAL. PENAL CODE §261.5. Although many still refer to this section as "statutory rape,"
the legislature intended to separate it from the crime of forcible rape. People v. Puckett, 44 Cal.
App. 3d 607, 611, 118 Cal. Rptr. 884, 887 (1975). Therefore, a male who makes an indecent
overture to a young female could no longer be charged with "assault with intent to commit rape."
Id. at 611, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 886.
5. CAL. STATS. 1979, c. 994, §1.
6. Penal Code Section 264 provides that unlawful sexual intercourse is "punishable either
by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year or in the state prison" (emphasis
added), indicating that it may be prosecuted as either a misdemeanor or a felony. Since the pun-
ishment for felony conviction is not stated in Section 264, Penal Code Section 18 becomes opera-
tive, providing for the punishment of 16 months, or two or three years. Under the Uniform
Determinative Sentencing Act, CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1139, § 1, at 5062 (amended by CAL. STATS.
1977, c. 165, §15, at 647) the court must impose the middle term unless aggravating or mitigating
circumstances are found. CAL. PENAL CODE § l170(b). Therefore, the maximum possible sen-
tence faced by a male offender of Section 261.5 is three years in state prison.
7. The statute specifies that only males will be held criminally liable. CAL. PENAL CODE
§261.5.
8. See id.
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boy under age 18, the crime of "Unlawful Sexual Intercourse" is inap-
plicable since only men can be offenders and only females can be vic-
tims.9 Section 261.5 does not recognize the consent of a minor female
to an act of sexual intercourse' but it makes no statement about a mi-
nor male's consent." Since under Section 261.5 a minor male cannot
be the "victim," the statute affords him no protection from older
predators of the opposite sex.'
2
Although social attitudes about women have changed radically in
recent years, Section 261.5 perpetuates the myth that young females
alone need paternalistic protection by the state. 3 While protection of
children is undeniably a proper subject of legislative concern, a law
that protects female children and not male children makes subtle state-
ments about the roles children are expected to follow. Special protec-
tion is afforded to the female since she is considered "innocent and
naive."' 4 The lack of protection for the male presumes that he is exper-
ienced and self-sufficient. These assumptions underlying the law are
anachronisms, in a society in which old notions of role typing are being
discarded, and in which females have made remarkable progress to-
ward equality.'
5
Not only is Section 261.5 flawed in singling out females for its pro-
tections and males for its burdens, but the purpose behind Section
261.5 places it years behind other Penal Code provisions dealing with
consensual sex crimes.' 6 Those sections concentrate on the protection
of children, both female and male, from child abuse and exploitation.' 7
Section 261.5 is concerned with quite another protection-that of the
virtue and chastity of young females.'
8
In 1979 the California Supreme Court considered a constitutional
challenge to Penal Code Section 261.5 in Michael M v. Superior
9. See id.
10. Since the female is "presumed too innocent and naive to understand the implications and
nature of her act," she is incapable of giving consent. People v. Hernandez, 61 Cal. 2d 529, 531,
393 P.2d 673, 674, 39 Cal. Rptr. 361, 362 (1964).
11. By providing no sanction against sexual intercourse with an underage male, Section 261.5
by implication recognizes his consent. See CAL. PENAL CODE §261.5. But cf. id §§272 (contribut-
ing to a minor's delinquency), 286 (sodomy), 288 (lewd and lascivious conduct with a child under
14), 288a (perversion; copulation with mouth), where the consent of an underage male is not a
defense to the crime. See generalo People v. Brown, 6 Cal. App. 3d 619, 624, 86 Cal. Rptr. 149,
152 (1970).
12. But an adult female may be charged with violating Penal Code Section 272 (contributing
to a minor's delinquency) and Section 288 (lewd and lascivious conduct on a child under age 14).
13. See notes 71-78 and accompanying text infra.
14. 61 Cal. 2d at 531, 393 P.2d at 674, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
15. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d 608, 615, 601 P.2d 572, 577, 159 Cal. Rptr. 340,
345 (1979) (Mosk, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 2984 (1980).
16. See notes 126-141 and accompanying text infra.
17. See notes 126-141 and accompanying text infra.
18. 25 Cal. 3d at 619, 601 P.2d at 597, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 347 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Contra Id.,
at 611, 601 P.2d at 574, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 342.
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Court.9 The accused, Michael, was a 17 year old male and the victim,
Sharon, was a 16 year old female. The facts of the case indicated that
Sharon willingly participated in the sexual activity.20 The court re-
jected Michael's contention that prosecuting him and not Sharon for a
mutual act violated his right to equal protection.2'
This comment will show that Section 261.5 violates the equal protec-
tion clauses of both the California22 and the United States Constitu-
tions23 under recent state and federal decisions dealing with sex
discrimination. First, the comment will illustrate that the historical
purpose of the statutory rape provision conflicts with the purpose enun-
ciated by the California Supreme Court in Michael M It will then
show that both the purported and actual purposes behind Section 261.5
are inadequate under California and United States equal protection re-
quirements to support a gender-specific law with criminal conse-
quences. After examining the purpose behind comparable consensual
sex crimes, the comment will suggest that child abuse prevention
should be the proper objective of an unlawful sexual intercourse stat-
ute. The comment will conclude with a legislative proposal narrowly
drawn to effectuate this purpose.
EQUAL PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS FOR GENDER-BASED LAWS
States have broad discretion in the use of their lawmaking powers to
mold laws that conform to the needs of their citizenry.24 Although the
fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees
equal protection of the laws,25 equal protection decisions have long rec-
ognized that a state cannot function in its legislative capacity without
19. 25 Cal. 3d 608, 601 P.2d 572, 159 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 2984
(1980).
20. The MichaelM. minority elucidate some of the highlights of Sharon and Michael's eve-
ning:
On the evening in question, Sharon and her 21 year old sister bought a half pint of
whiskey and two Pepsi Colas to use as mixers. After making this purchase they walked
to a bus stop; Michael and two other male youths rode by on their bicycles, then returned
and asked the girls if they would like to drink some wine. The girls replied affirmatively,
and accompanied the boys to the railroad tracks. The group drank while walking to the
tracks and continued to do so on arrival. Sharon and Michael then went into the bushes,
lay down, and began hugging and kissing for half an hour. They were interrupted by
Sharon's sister, who asked Sharon if she was ready to leave. Sharon replied that she was
not, and her sister left with one of the other boys. With remarkable impartiality, and on
her own initiative, Sharon then began kissing the third boy. After he, too, departed,
Sharon and Michael resumed their sexual activities. ...
Id. at 617, 601 P.2d at 577, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 345 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
21. See id. at 614, 601 P.2d at 576, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 344.
22. CAL. CONST. art. 1, §7.
23. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, §1.
24. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425
(1961); Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
25. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, §1.
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classifying its citizens for various purposes and treating some differ-
ently from others.26 When the classification is "rationally" based,27 un-
even effects upon particular groups are ordinarily of no concern.28
Certain classifications, however, in themselves supply a reason to infer
antipathy29 and a higher level of justification is required to support
them.
A. California Equal Protection
The California Constitution may in a given case "demand an analy-
sis different from that which would be obtained if only the fourteenth
amendment were applicable."30 In exercising the "independent vital-
ity"3 1 of the equal protection guarantee of the California Constitu-
tion,32 the California Supreme Court has chosen to apply a standard of
review for gender-based laws that is more stringent than the federal
standard.33
In Sailler Inn v. Kirby,34 the court considered the constitutionality of
a California law prohibiting women from tending bar unless they or
their husband held a liquor license.35 No comparable limitation was
placed on men.36 In striking down the law as being violative of the
state and federal constitutions, the court declared that "classifications
based on sex should be treated as suspect."' 37 Sai'er Inn thus estab-
lished the principle that gender-based classifications in California law
are to be subjected to the "strict scrutiny" normally reserved for racial
classifications, 3 8 a principle that consistently has been affirmed.
39
Under this test, the state must show both that it has a compelling inter-
26. See Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 (1944); Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Coleman,
277 U.S. 32, 37 (1928); Stebbins v. Riley, 268 U.S. 137, 142 (1925).
27. See, e.g., Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351 (1979) ("legislative classifications are valid
unless they bear no rational relationship to a permissible state objective"); New York Authority v.
Beasor, 440 U.S. 568, 587 (1979) ("General rules which apply evenhandedly to all persons within
the jurisdiction of the state unquestionably comply with [the rational basis] principle"); Royster
Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412,415 (1920) (classifications "must be reasonable, not arbitrary,
and must rest on a ground of difference having a fair, and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation").
28. Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979); see Jefferson v. Hackney,
406 U.S. 535, 546 (1972).
29. 442 U.S. at 272.
30. Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 764, 557 P.2d 929, 950, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 366 (1976).
31. Id.
32. CAL. CONsT. art. 1, §7.
33. See text accompanying notes 51-56 infra.
34. 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971).
35. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §25656.
36. 5 Cal. 3d at 15, 485 P.2d at 538, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
37. Id. at 17, 485 P.2d at 539, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
38. Molar v. Gates, 98 Cal. App. 3d 1, 13, 159 Cal. Rptr. 239, 246 (1979).
39. Id See also Hardy v. Stumpf, 21 Cal. 3d 1, 13, 576 P.2d 1342, 1344, 145 Cal. Rptr. 176,
178 (1978); Arp v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 19 Cal. 3d 395, 400, 563 P.2d 849, 851, 138 Cal.
Rptr. 293, 295 (1977).
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est that justifies the statutory classification and that the classification is
necessary to achieve that interest.4" This places a heavy burden on the
state since classifications considered "suspect" traditionally have been
presumed invalid4' and have been upheld only if there is an extraordi-
nary justification.4  The United States Supreme Court, on the other
hand, provides a lesser standard of protection against gender-based
classification under its fourteenth amendment analysis.
B. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "classifica-
tions based on gender, like those based on race, have traditionally been
the touchstone for pervasive and often subtle discrimination." 43 But
unlike race, the Court has not pronounced gender to be a suspect classi-
fication calling for the same high degree of scrutiny.44 Instead, the
Court has developed a middle ground of review between the traditional
rational basis test and the strict scrutiny test.
In 1971 in Reed v. Reed" the Court began moving in a different di-
rection in its equal protection analysis. Reed involved a challenge to an
Idaho statute that established a scheme for the selection of the adminis-
trator of an estate. 46 The challenged portion of the statute provided
that if it were necessary to select between two competing applicants, the
male was to be preferred over the female.47 A unanimous Supreme
Court struck down the law, questioning for the first time whether the
interests offered by the state were advanced by a gender-specific law.48
It was contended that the reduction of the workload on the probate
courts by eliminating a class of contests and the avoidance of in-
trafamily controversy were the lawful goals of the statute.49 However
laudable these goals might be, the Court found them insufficient to jus-
40. Westbrook v. Mihaly, 2 Cal. 3d 765, 784-85, 471 P.2d 487, 500-01, 87 Cal. Rptr. 839, 852-
53 (1970); 98 Cal. App. 3d at 13, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 246. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762,766-
67 (1977); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 638 (1969).
41. Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351 (1979).
42. See, e.g., Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 443 U.S. 193 (1979); Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (racial classifications substantially validated due to
extraordinary circumstances).
43. Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979); see Caban v. Mohammed,
441 U.S. 380, 398 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
44. In Frondiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973), Justice Brennan in a plurality opin-
ion declared sex to be a suspect classification. This view has never been adopted by a majority of
the Court.
45. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
46. Id. at 72-73.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 76.
49. Id. at 76-77.
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tify mandatory preference for males. °
This departure from the traditional "rational basis" test was enunci-
ated clearly in Craig v. Boren.5 In that case, the Supreme Court re-
viewed an Oklahoma statute that prohibited the sale of 3.2 percent beer
to males under age 21 and to females under age 18.52 The Court found
that the gender-based differential constituted invidious discrimination
against males 18 to 20 years of age.13 The Craig Court formulated a
two-part test to determine if a gender-based classification comports
with the equal protection guarantee of the fourteenth amendment.
First, the classification "must serve important government objec-
tives,"54 and second, the classification "must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives. ' 55 This statement of the "middle tier"
test has been employed frequently since Craig to strike down gender-
specific laws that have caused unequal treatment. 6
AN EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS OF SECTION 261.5
In Michael M., the California Supreme Court held that the legisla-
tive intent behind the statutory rape law was the prevention of teenage
pregnancies. 7 Although no legal authority* could be cited by the ma-
jority to support this theory, it was adopted by the court in order ulti-
mately to find the law constitutional.5
The prevention of teenage pregnancies is certainly a serious enough
purpose to meet either the "important government objective" portion
of the Craig test 59 or the "compelling state interest" portion of the
Sailer Inn test.6° A preliminary question, however, is whether or not
"pregnancy prevention" was the actual historical purpose behind the
statutory rape law.
50. Id.
51. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
52. Id. at 191-92.
53. Id. at 204.
54. Id. at 197.
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (New York statute permitting unwed
mothers but not unwed fathers from blocking adoption through the withholding of consent found
unconstitutional); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (Alabama statutory scheme imposing alimony
duty on men only struck down); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (Social Security re-
quirement that men must prove dependency on wife whereas women were presumed dependent
on husbands for purposes of survivor's benefits ruled unconstitutional); Stanton v. Stanton, 429
U.S. 501 (1977) (Utah age-of-majority statute for purposes of ending support obligations which
specified different ages for male and female offspring struck down).
57. 25 Cal. 3d 608, 611, 601 P.2d 572, 574, 159 Cal. Rptr. 340, 342 (1979), cert. granted, 100S,
Ct. 2984 (1980).
58. Id. at 614, 601 P.2d at 576, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 344.
59. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). See notes 79-83 and accompanying text infra.
60. Sail'er Inn v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 16, 485 P.2d 529, 539, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 339 (1971).
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A. Historical Purpose
Statutory prohibitions against consensual sexual relations with
young females first appeared in Anglo-American law in thirteenth cen-
tury England.6 The law forbade unlawful carnal knowledge and
abuse "of any Maiden within Age,"62 that age being twelve years or
younger .63 In the sixteenth century the age of consent was lowered to
ten years of age.64
Since few girls under the age of twelve, and virtually no girls under
the age of ten have the physical ability to become pregnant, 65 these
statutes could not have been promulgated to prevent pregnancy. Early
English statutory rape law, directed at protecting young girls, resulted
from popular notions of females during that era-that they were intel-
lectually inferior and that before the prescribed age they were incompe-
tent of mindful decisions.66 No similar attention was directed at
providing protection for young boys since they were not considered
burdened with the same inherent flaws.67
California modeled its first statutory rape law after the English stat-
ute, using ten years as the age of consent.68 In subsequent years the age
of consent was raised until, in 1913, it was fixed at the present age of
18.69 At no time, from the original enactment through the subsequent
amendments, has the legislature or any court, other than the Michael
M. court, ever expressed the view that prevention of teenage
pregnancies was the objective of the statute.7°
Judicial decisions throughout the history of the statutory rape law
61. 3 Edw. I, ch. 13 (1275); 13 Edw. I, ch. 34 (1285); see 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
212 (1771).
62. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 212 (1771).
63. See Meyers, Reasonable Mistake of,4ge: A Needed Defense to Statutory Rape, 64 MICH.
L. REV. 105, 110 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Meyers].
64. 18 Eliz. I, ch. 7, §4 (1576); Meyers, supra note 63, at 110. See also 4 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 212 (1771).
65. The onset of puberty in a female is typically between the ages of 11 and 15. GtrnTON,
TEXTBOOK OF MEDICAL PHYSIOLOGY 1087 (1976).
66. Meyers, supra note 63, at 110. See generally V. BULLOUGH, THE SUBORDINATE SEX
(1973).
67. See generaly V. BULLOUGH, THE SUBORDINATE SEX (1973).
68. The law had its origin in California's first penal statute (CAL. STATS. 1850, c. 99, §47, at
234) which was subsequently reenacted as Section 261, Subdivision I of the Penal Code of 1872.
Michael M. v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d 608, 617, 601 P.2d 572, 578, 159 Cal. Rptr. 340, 346
(1979) (Mosk, J., dissenting), cert granted, 100 S. Ct. 2984 (1980). The 1576 version of the English
statutory rape law was brought to American shores as part of the English common law. Meyers,
supra note 63, at I11.
69. CAL. STATS. 1913, c. 122, §1, at 212. In 1889, the statute was amended to make the age of
consent 14, CAL. STATS. 1889, c. 191, §1, at 223, then in 1897 the age was advanced to 16, CAL.
STATS. 1897, c. 139, §1, at 201.
70. See, e.g., People v. Verdegreen, 106 Cal. 211, 214-15, 39 P. 607, 608 (1895) (the "obvious"
purpose of the statute, as stated by the court, did not include pregnancy prevention); People v.
Courtney, 180 Cal. App. 2d 61, 62-63, 4 Cal. Rptr. 274, 276 (1960) (court did not mention preg-
nancy prevention in describing the purpose of the law).
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have expressed clearly a different legislative intent-the protection of
young females who, because they are frail and submissive, need special
paternalistic protection and moral guidance in their youthful years.7
In People v. Hernandez72 the court explained that:
The law's concern with her capacity or lack thereof to so understand
is explained in part by a popular conception of the social, moral and
personal values which are preserved by the abstinence from sexual
indulgence on the part of a young woman. An unwise disposition of
her sexual favor is deemed to do harm both to herself and the social
mores by which the community's conduct patterns are established.73
Males apparently were not the objects of such "benevolence. 74 In ex-
plaining the justification for male-only prosecution for statutory rape,
the Hernandez court borrowed another sexual stereotype-that the
male is "conclusively presumed to be responsible for the occurrence" of
sexual relations.75
So strong were judicial desires to preserve the chastity and virtue of
females that even advances on consenting young females have been
held to constitute "assault with intent to commit rape,"7 6 even though a
mere advance cannot put the young female in danger of conceiving.
The Supreme Court of California rationalized its action as "the protec-
tion of society by protecting from violation the virtue of young and
unsophisticated girls."77 The court later identified the evil inherent in
improper advances on young females to be "the insidious approach
and vile tampering with their persons that primarily undermines the
virtue of young girls and eventually destroys it.""8
Thus, there never has been any historical indication that the preven-
tion of teenage pregnancies was the actual legislative objective of the
statutory rape law. Case law reveals instead that the law was motivated
by then popular notions of sexual stereotypes. Thus, the United States
Supreme Court must determine whether it will accept the California
court's rationale or the true historical purpose when it reviews Michael
A during the 1980-81 term.7 9
71. See note 66 supra.
72. 61 Cal. 2d 529, 393 P.2d 673, 39 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1964).
73. Id. at 531, 393 P.2d at 674, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
74. See, e.g., People v. Hemandez, 61 Cal. 2d 529, 393 P.2d 673, 39 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1964) (the
court confined its discussion on the damage from underage sexual intercourse only to females);
People v. verdegreen, 106 Cal. 211, 39 P. 607 (1895) (the court excluded boys when it discussed
the potential damage to a minor person's virtue from sexual intercourse).
75. 61 Cal. 2d at 531, 393 P.2d at 674, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
76. See 106 Cal. at 215, 39 P. at 609; People v. Gordon, 70 Cal. 467, 468-69, 11 P. 762, 763
(1886).
77. 106 Cal. at 214, 39 P. at 608 (emphasis added).
78. Id. at 215, 39 P. at 608.
79. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d 608, 601 P.2d 572, 159 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1979),
cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 2984 (1980).
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B. The Michael M. Revision.
The MichaelM. court supported its finding that the legislative intent
behind the statutory rape law was the prevention of teenage
pregnancies by citing statistical studies indicating that teenage
pregnancies are a major social and medical problem.8" The cited stud-
ies revealed that between 1971 and 1976 over half of all children born
to mothers from 15 to 17 years of age were illegitimate.8' Medical risks
to teenage mothers and their infants are much higher than to women in
their twenties.8" Finally, the court pointed to the high rate of leaving
high school among teenage mothers.8 3 These factors, concluded the
court, warranted considering "pregnancy prevention" to be a compel-
ling state interest.
8 4
The United States Supreme Court, however, has viewed with suspi-
cion attempts to prove legislative intent through the simple production
of statistics. In Craig v. Boren,85 the Court referred with skepticism to
the legislative intent advanced by Oklahoma, since the proffered intent
was supported by statistics rather than legal authority. The Court
stated that "proving broad sociological propositions by statistics is a
dubious business, and one that inevitably is in tension with the norma-
tive philosophy that underlies the Equal Protection Clause. ' 86 The
mere recitation by the state of a benign purpose, the Court has said, is
"not an automatic shield which protects against any inquiry into the
actual purposes underlying a statutory scheme."87 In equal protection
cases the United States Supreme Court does not have to accept the state
determination of legislative intent but may examine independently the
statutory scheme and its history for an independent assessment of the
true legislative intent.88 The purpose of this inquiry is to prohibit a
state from substituting an important social problem for the true legisla-
tive intent to save a law with an unconstitutional effect.
Thus, when the United States Supreme Court reviews MichaelM., it
should look beyond the finding of the California Supreme Court to
80. 25 Cal. 3d at 611-12, 601 P.2d at 574-75, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 342-43. The court cited statis-
tics from the following sources, among others: the California Department of Health Services,
Center for Health Statistics, Birth Cohort Records; Green & Potteiger, TEENAGE PREGNANCY: A
MAJOR PROBLEM FOR MINORS (Zero Population Growth Pamphlet 1977).
81. 25 Cal. 3d at 611, 601 P.2d at 574-75, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 342-43.
82. Id. at 611-12, 601 P.2d at 575, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 343.
83. Id. at 612, 601 P.2d at 575, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 343.
84. Id. at 611, 601 P.2d at 574, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 342.
85. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
86. Id. at 204.
87. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975).
88. Id. at 648 n.16. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 449 (1972) (the Court did not
accept the Massachusetts finding that deterrence of premarital sex was the objective of a criminal
statute which forbade the giving of contraceptives to all unmarried persons).
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determine the true objective behind Penal Code Section 261.5. Clear
historical evidence demands that the Court reject the theory that the
statute was created to prevent pregnancies and find instead that the
legislative purpose was to protect the virtue of young females.8 9
C Applying the Craig Standards
1. The Important Governmental Interest
To determine whether the "protection of female virtue" constitutes a
governmental objective sufficiently important to permit gender classifi-
cations, the Court inquires whether or not such an objective is based on
"archaic and overbroad generalizations"90 and "old notions"9' consis-
tent with "the role typing society has long imposed." 92 The protection
of the virtue of young females, and not of the virtue of young males,
clearly is based on such antiquated notions.93 Since the objective is
based on "old notions," it fails to meet the "important government ob-
jective" portion of the Craig 94 test. As such, the Supreme Court
should strike down Section 261.5 as a violation of the fourteenth
amendment.
2. Relationship Between Objectives and Gender-Specftcity
Even if the United States Supreme Court forgoes any inquiry into
the actual objectives of Section 261.5 and accepts the California finding
that pregnancy prevention is the true objective of the law,95 the statute
still must satisfy the second part of the Craig test to pass constitutional
muster. The Court must find that the gender classification is substan-
tial related to the state's objective, 96 reducing teenage pregnancies,
and that this goal is advanced by prosecuting only males and by pro-
tecting only females even when both parties are underage.
None of the justifications offered by the California Supreme Court in
Michael M. explains why sex specificity is needed to support the pur-
ported purpose of Penal Code Section 261.5. Most significantly, the
MichaelM. majority did not explain adequately how male-only liabil-
ity advances the state objective of pregnancy prevention more than mu-
89. See notes 57-78 and accompanying text supra.
90. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975).
91. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14 (1975).
92. Id. at 15.
93. See notes 71-78 and accompanying text supra.
94. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
95. In Craig, the Court decided to forego an inquiry into the actual intent of the statute and
leave for another day the question of whether the "litigant simply is selecting a convenient, but
false, post hoc rationalization." Id. at 199 n.7, 200. The Court then struck down the gender-
specific law on other grounds. Id. at 204.
96. 429 U.S. at 197.
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tual liability. The court referred only to a possibility that a female
might be hesitant to complain if there were a possibility of prosecu-
tion.9 7 But the testimony of the minor female is not imperative to prov-
ing a case. Additionally, the possibility that prosecution may become
more difficult does not justify retaining an unconstitutional law.98
In Meloon v. Helgmoe9 9 the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit considered the constitutionality of New Hampshire's sex-
specific statutory rape law. The court concluded that the statute, which
made it a felony for a male to have consensual sexual intercourse with
females under age 15 but which did not apply reciprocally to females
with males under age 15, violated the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment."co The court viewed the pregnancy prevention
rationale offered by the state with special skepticism. While admitting
that the female's unique ability to bear children is a difference that
could justify certain gender-based leglislation, the court expressed the
fear that "the very uniqueness of the characteristic makes it an avail-
able hindsight catchall rationalization for laws that were promulgated
with totally different purposes in mind."''1 1 In gender-based equal pro-
tection cases, continued the court, "due process requires that there be a
legitimate basis for presuming that the rule was actually intended to
serve [the] interest put forward by the government as its justifica-
tion." 102 The court then found the pregnancy prevention rationale ad-
vanced by the state too tenuous to survive the degree of scrutiny
required by the equal protection clause.' 3
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently sounded a similar ob-
jection to federal criminal "carnal knowledge" statutes0 4 that identi-
fied the victim and offender according to sex. 10 5 In United States v.
Hicks, 6 the court found that the government had not met its burden
of showing how the proffered governmental interests in prevention of
teenage pregnancies and physical injuries were "substantially fur-
thered" by punishment of only the male.' 0 7 In affirming the dismissal
97. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d 608, 614, 601 P.2d 572, 576, 159 Cal. Rptr. 340,
344 (1979), cert. granted, I00 S. Ct. 2984 (1980).
98. Cf. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (administrative convenience did not support a gen-
der-based law). Id. at 76.
99. 564 F.2d 602 (Ist Cir., 1977).
100. Id. at 603.
101. Id. at 607.
102. Id. at 608, citing Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring); see
Hampton v. Mow Sun Song, 426 U.S. 88, 103 (1976).
103. 564 F.2d at 608.
104. See 18 U.S.C. §§1153, 2032 (1976).
105. See id.
106. 48 U.S.L.W. 2748 (April 16, 1980).
107. Id.
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of the criminal indictment against the defendants,10 8 the court said:
[Tihe government supplied no evidence that males necessarily always
do or should bear greater responsibility for causing sexual contact.
No evidence was produced explaining why punishment of males only
is more likely to deter teenage pregnancies than punishment of just
females, or of both partners.'
0 9
Because the government had not shown that its gender-based assign-
ment of the roles of "victim" and "perpetrator" bore a substantial rela-
tionship to its asserted goals, the federal criminal statutes denied equal
protection as guaranteed by the fifth amendment's due process
clause. 10
The foregoing discussion illustrates the unconstitutionality of Section
261.5 under the federal constitution. It is evident, however, that the
California court should have found the section violative of the Califor-
nia Constitution.
D. California Equal Protection
Granting that pregnancy prevention is a compelling state interest under
the Sailer Inn strict scrutiny analysis,' it still must be shown that
gender classification is necessary to further that interest. A careful
reading of the MichaelM. majority opinion, however, reveals flaws in
this analysis as applied to Penal Code Section 261.5.
In upholding Section 261.5, the MichaelM. court held that sex is the
only possible classification that can be adopted in identifying victim
and offender.' 12 This follows, reasoned the court, from the "immutable
physical fact" that it is the female exclusively who can conceive after
the sexual act, causing her alone to incur the adverse consequences of
pregnancy.' ' 3 Criminal sanctions against males only, therefore, are
"necessary" because "they are the only persons who may physiologi-
cally cause the result which the law properly seeks to avoid."" 14
The court further defended the sex classification by saying "[i]t is the
prerogative, indeed the duty of the Legislature to recognize degrees of
culpability when drafting a penal code.""' 5 In fulfilling this duty the
legislature "need not blind itself' to the adverse consequences suffered
by one of the participants, the female."I6 Therefore, the sex-based clas-
108. Id. at 2749.
109. Id.
110. Id.
I 11. See text accompanying notes 34-42 supra.
112. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d. 608, 612, 601 P.2d 572, 575, 159 Cal, Rptr. 340,
343 (1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 2984 (1980).
113. Id. at 611, 601 P.2d at 574, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 342.
114. Id. at 612, 601 P.2d at 575, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 343.
115. Id. at 613, 601 P.2d at 575, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 343.
116. Id. at 612, 601 P.2d at 575, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 343.
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sifications met the "necessary" requirement of Sail'er Inn."7
The court, however, confused "culpability" with "consequences."
The proscribed activity in Section 261.5 is an act of sexual inter-
course. I 8 As in the facts of Michael M, two minors may freely con-
sent, thus making them both responsible for the occurence of the act.
The risk of an additional, non-legal burden incurred by one party does
not justify the imposition of punitive sanctions on the other party only;
potential future non-legal consequences are not pertinent to weighing
the blame for the act itself." 9
In saying that male-only liability for the consensual act is necessary
because the male is "the only person who may physiologically cause" a
pregnancy, the court ignored not only a basic principle of causation,
but a fundamental biological fact as well. Pregnancy is still a joint ven-
ture. Thus, the court failed to explain satisfactorily how male-only
prosecution for the joint act is necessary to prevent pregnancies. In
other criminal contexts, it has been held that the law cannot hold one
party as more blameworthy than the other for the conception of a
child. 2 Such underinclusiveness of criminal responsibility violates
equal protection guarantees because the legislative goal is not advanced
by selecting only one of the parties to blame.'
2'
Another reason suggests an erroneous conclusion by the court in
Michael M The California Supreme Court has held that
to pass muster under the California equal protection clause, a statu-
tory classification founded on the suspect classification of sex must
also represent the narrowest and least restrictive means by which the
objective may be obtained.'
22
Given that the objective is pregnancy prevention, Section 261.5 pros-
cribes an act that does not necessarily bear the risk of conception.
Thus, the legislature did not use the narrowest and least restrictive
means to further its goal.
Under the current statutory scheme, impossibility of conception is
not a defense to the crime. Even if either party were infertile or sterile,
or if contraceptives were used, no defense is allowed under this "preg-
117. Id.
118. CAL. PENAL CODE §261.5.
119. The dissent in MichaelM. criticized the majority reasoning which condoned the exonera-
tion of one party to a criminal act based on later burdens on that party by drawing the example
that "an outwardly respectable person who engages in illicit drug activity is not rendered less
blameworthy when his arrest and conviction for that conduct also results in social ostracism and
loss of professional status." 25 Cal. 3d at 622, 601 P.2d at 581, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 349 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
120. See Commonwealth v. MacKenzie, 368 Mass. 613, 615, 334 N.E.2d 613, 615 (1975).
121. Id.
122. Arp v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 19 Cal. 3d 395, 406, 563 P.2d 849, 855, 138
Cal. Rptr. 293, 299 (1977).
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nancy prevention" law. 123 The law does not require that seminal emis-
sion occur for the crime to be completed.' 24 The "narrowest and least
restrictive means" of preventing teenage pregnancies would be to pro-
vide for impossibility of conception as an affirmative defense. Since
Section 261.5 does not employ the least restrictive means to achieve its
ameliorative goal, it is overinclusive and therefore should have been
ruled unconstitutional under the cases applying the equal protection
provision of the California Constitution.'25
The above discussion has shown how Section 261.5 is unconstitu-
tional in its present state. The following section will propose a revision
of the statute to meet state and federal equal protection requirements.
A NEW "UNLAWFUL SEXUAL INTERCOURSE" STATUTE
California should reevaluate what the legitimate objective of an "un-
lawful sexual intercourse" law should be. It should determine whether
"teenage pregnancies" is the only evil resulting from sexual relations
with minors, or if other reasons merit consideration. Reference to other
nonforcible sex crimes statutes in the California Penal Code is helpful
in this analysis.
A. Comparable Nonforcible Sex Crimes
California law defines the act of oral copulation as "the act of copu-
lating the mouth of one person with the sexual organ of another per-
son."' 26 The act of sodomy is defined as "sexual contact consisting of
contact between the penis of one person and the anus of another per-
son." 1
27
Both of these definitions are then followed by a list of situations in
which the described act becomes a crime. Such acts are criminal when
committed by force,128 on an unconscious person, 29 or when the par-
ties are confined in a prison facility.'
30
123. 25 Cal. 3d at 613, 601 P.2d at 575, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 343. The MichaelM. court adopted
the reasoning of the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine in State v. Rundlei, 391 A.2d 815 (1978), in
which the Maine court referred to "the doubtful efficacy of contraceptives." Id. at 820 n. 18, 821.
124. CAL. PENAL CODE §263.
125. See 19 Cal. 3d at 406, 563 P.2d at 855, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 299. See also Johnson v. Hamil-
ton, 15 Cal. 3d 461, 541 P.2d 881, 125 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1975); Sail'er Inn v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d I, 485
P.2d 529,95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971); Westbrook v. Mihaly, 2 Cal. 2d 765, 471 P.2d 487, 87 Cal. Rptr.
839 (1970).
126. CAL. PENAL CODE §288a.
127. Id. §286.
128. Id. §§286(d), 288a(d).
129. Id. §§286(f), 288a(f).
130. Id. §§286(e), 288a(e). Forcible sexual activities in prison goes highly unreported due to
fear of reprisal from other prisoners, and are often the source of violent altercations. The purpose
of banning sexual activities in prison is maintenance of prison discipline and order. People v.
Santibonez, 91 Cal. App. 3d 287, 291, 154 Cal. Rptr. 74, 76-77 (1979).
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The remaining provisions of the oral copulation and sodomy statutes
make criminal such activity with minors. 3 ' Several age differentials
are used in this scheme, increasing the punishment in relation to the
increasing age difference between the child victim and the adult of-
fender. For example, acts of sodomy or oral copulation on a person
under the age of 18 are punishable by a maximum of one year in state
prison.1 32 If the participants, however willing, include a person over
the age of 21, and one who is under age 16, the proscribed act becomes
a felony 33 and the maximum punishment is three years confine-
ment. 34 When the child is under age 14 and the adult is more than ten
years older, the punishment of the crime increases to eight years in
prison.
13 5
The increasing severity of the penalties indicates that the legislature
had the prevention of child abuse as its objective in enacting this
scheme.' 36 Even if the minor were to consent, the law steps in to void
the consent, on the theory that children as. a group do not have the
ability to understand the nature and quality of their actions-especially
when being persuaded by an adamant adult. Therefore, consent is not
a defense.'
37
In People v. Gonzalez, 38 the court found "there is a compelling inter-
est in the protection of children from sexual molestation by persons
who are materially more mature."' 39 The defendant in that case chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the age differentials used in the sodomy
statute.140 The court upheld the differentials, recognizing that a child is
more likely to succumb to the sexual blandishment of someone much
older than when conduct is solicited by one close to the child's age.'
4'
B. Child Abuse and Unlawful Sexual Intercourse
Prevention of child abuse against both girls and boys should be the
objective of a new unlawful sexual intercourse law. All children would
gain the protection of such a sex-neutral law. Like the above-men-
tioned nonforcible sex crimes, an age differential would recognize de-
grees of culpability. By making the prevention of child abuse the
131. CAL. PENAL CODE §§286, 288a.
132. Id. §§286(b)(1), 288a(b)(1).
133. Id. §§286(b)(2), 288a(b)(2).
134. Id. §18.
135. Id. §§286(c), 288a(c).
136. See also People v. Gonzalez, 81 Cal. App. 3d 274, 277, 146 Fal. Rptr. 417, 419 (1978).
137. People v. Brown, 6 Cal. App. 3d 619, 624, 86 Cal. Rptr. 149, 152 (1970).
138. 81 Cal. App. 274, 146 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1978).
139. Id. at 277, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 419.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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principal objective behind a gender-neutral unlawful sexual intercourse
law, the legislature would place it in substantial conformity with the
other consensual sex crime statutes.
It should be noted, however, that there is a distinguishing feature
between the other nonforcible sex acts and sexual intercourse-only in-
tercourse can produce the consequence of pregnancy. But a gender-
neutral law aimed at child abuse would not ignore this feature. Since
sexual relations between minor females and adult males would still be
prohibited, a secondary interest in pregnancy prevention would be
served. But the protection of young boys also would be recognized.
Pregnancy may be unique to females, but sexual abuse is not. There-
fore, child abuse prevention should be the principal objective of the
statute, with pregnancy deterrence as one of its collateral objectives.
C Size of Victim and Offender Classes
Statistically, it is more likely that males rather than females will find
themselves in the role of the perpetrator.142 But such a generalization
regarding the frequency of female prosecution does not justify male-
only prosecution. 43 By prosecuting both men and women who have
had sekual relations with minors, the objective of the statute is more
closely served. Under this statute, both male and female perpetrators
of child abuse will be subject to equal prosecution and both male and
female victims will have equal protection. The traditional situation as-
sociated with "statutory rape"'-that of an adult man with an underage
girl-would still be criminal.
In a significant way, however, the pool of offenders under the ex-
isting law must be narrowed. As Section 261.5 reads now, an underage
boy can be convicted of a felony for engaging in sexual relations with
his teenage girlfriend. This is not in keeping with the spirit of a "child
abuse" statute, which is directed at adults who engage in sexual inter-
course with children.
The new unlawful sexual intercourse law should read:
Unlawful sexual intercourse is an act of sexual intercourse accom-
plished with a person not the spouse of the perpetrator, where the
victim is under the age of 18, and the perpetrator is at least 18. The
punishment is a maximum of one year in county jail. If the victim is
under 17, and the perpetrator is more than five years older than the
victim, the proscribed act becomes a felony, and the punishment is 16
months, two or three years. If the victim is under the age of 16, and
142. Attitudes of female passivity and male aggressiveness are still prevalent in our society.
See generally V. BULLOUGH, THE SUBORDINATE SEX (1973).
143. See generally Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975).
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the perpetrator is more than ten years older than the victim, the pun-
ishment is two, three, or four years.
144
This proposed unlawful sexual intercourse statute is a protective stat-
ute, to be enacted for the benefit of children as a group. It would be
inconsistent to permit a child to be prosecuted under it. Society may
not like teenagers experimenting in sexual intercourse with each other,
but criminal convictions are hardly the appropriate remedy to curb
their curiosities. Therefore, a new unlawful sexual intercourse law
should impose criminal liability only on adults. 1
45
CONCLUSION
Penal Code Section 261.5 is a statute based on antiquated beliefs of
sexual stereotyping. In its present state, it cannot pass constitutional
muster because its gender classifications do not serve to advance either
the actual or purported objectives of the statute. There is an important
goal, however, to be served in an unlawful sexual intercourse law. A
law that distributes its protections and burdens equally to both sexes
and is principally concerned with sexual abuse of minors by adults
serves a compelling state interest. The statute proposed in this com-
ment would be a valid exercise of the legislative discretion, and would
meet the equal protection requirements of both the California and
United States Constitutions.
Linda Sharfpe Waits
144. See note 6 supra, regarding requirement of determinative sentencing.
145. A person is generally recognized as an adult for purposes of criminal liability at age 18.
See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §602.
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